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We analyze the effect of changes in U.S. state personal exemptions on the financing structure 
and performance of a representative sample of start-ups.  An increase in the amount of 
borrower’s personal wealth protected in bankruptcy reduces the availability of bank credit to 
all start-ups.  Owners of unlimited liability businesses, who benefit from the increase in 
wealth insurance, offset the reduction in bank credit by investing more money in the firm.  
We find no such response for start-ups whose entrepren urs’ personal wealth is already 
protected by limited liability.  Consequently, corpations experience lower growth rates and 
higher failure rates, while proprietorships performance is not negatively affected. 
 
 
Keywords: Debtor protection, bankruptcy, start-ups, credit availability, agency problems.  





Start-ups are important drivers of competition, innovation, and job creation. The 
fraction of employment accounted for by U.S. startups over the 1980-2005 period is about 3 
percent per year.  While this seems a small fraction of overall employment, it is large 
compared to the average annual net employment growth for the same period in U.S. (about 
1.8 percent). These figures imply that, on average, U.S. net employment growth rates would 
have been negative if one excluded the new jobs created by start-ups.1 
Despite their economic importance, start-ups are fragile business ventures that 
experience high rates of failure during their first years of operation.  Economic theory has 
long rationalized entrepreneurial failure as an inevitable consequence of Schumpeterian 
creative destruction. However, start-ups are also kn wn to be particularly vulnerable to 
external factors that are well beyond the risky nature of entrepreneurship.  One such factor 
that is central to virtually all discussions of entr preneurship is access to credit.  If external 
financing is easily available, start-ups can better ap investment opportunities, challenge 
competitors, and face temporary liquidity needs, such as those to survive a recession.   
In this paper, we show that a higher level of debtor protection provided by U.S. 
personal bankruptcy law reduces the availability of financing to start-ups.  Moreover, we 
show that through the financing channel, higher debtor protection reduces these start-ups’ 
growth rates and survival chances.  We obtain these findings exploiting the passage of state 
laws that increased the amount of borrower’s personal wealth protected in bankruptcy, during 
the period 2004-2008.  The dataset used is the Kaufm n Firm Survey (KFS), a longitudinal 
survey that collects information for a sample of 4,928 start-ups that began operations in 2004 
in the United States.  Since the KFS tracks start-ups through time, we use within-firm 
variation in financing structure and performance, allowing us to rule out unobserved firm 
                                               
1 Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2009). 
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heterogeneity concerns.  Moreover, since the degree of protection provided by the law 
depends on the extent of the liability of the firm owner, we assess differential effects of the 
law according to the legal form of the firm.  This allows us to address endogeneity concerns 
regarding the passage of the laws.   
Specifically, our study uses the passage of state lws that increased personal 
bankruptcy exemptions.  In the U.S., most debtors file for personal bankruptcy under Chapter 
7.  In this case, they must turn over any unsecured assets they own above a predetermined 
exemption level, while their future earnings are completely exempt from the obligation to 
repay.  A higher exemption level provides partial wealth insurance to debtors, because it 
reduces the asset value that creditors can seize in bankruptcy.  Previous research shows that 
banks anticipate moral hazard and opportunistic behavior from borrowers by reducing credit 
availability to households (Gropp et al., 1997). 
While personal bankruptcy law is designed for consumers, it also affects unlimited 
liability firms (proprietorships), since there is no legal distinction between a proprietorship 
and its owner.  In contrast, personal bankruptcy law does not apply to limited liability firms 
(corporations).  Therefore, one would expect higher bankruptcy exemptions to have stronger 
effects on proprietorships than on corporations. 
  Our paper provides two novel results that greatly challenge these views.  First, we 
uncover a new channel through which exemptions affect limited liability start-ups.  In our 
U.S. representative sample, a large fraction of corporation owners report that they use 
personal bank loans to finance their firms’ operations.  We find that laws that raise 
exemptions reduce the volume of personal bank loans corporation owners obtain to finance 
the firm.  Consistent with the view that access to credit is a key determinant of firm growth 
and survival (Holtz-Eakin et al, 1994), we find that these laws decrease the growth rates of 
corporations, as well as their survival rates.  
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 Second, we show that increases in exemptions do not harm – if anything, they 
improve – the performance of proprietorships.  This is a surprising finding, since our 
evidence suggests that proprietorships also face a reduction in credit supply.  However, we 
also find that proprietorship owners offset this negative supply effect by investing more 
personal funds in the firm.  By doing so, proprietorship owners are able to maintain their 
start-ups’ financing levels. 
We argue that the channel we uncover actually bears a simple economic interpretation.  
Under unlimited liability, the entrepreneur’s personal wealth is exposed to business risks.  An 
increase in exemptions provides additional insurance against these risks.  In response to the 
exogenous increase in wealth insurance, proprietorship owners optimally increase their 
exposure to firm risk by investing more personal funds in the firm.2  In contrast, corporation 
owners do not experience this increase in insurance, since the limited liability form already 
insures the owner against business losses. 
  Our study offers an important contribution to the lit rature.  To the best of our 
knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate how debtor protection affects both the 
financing structure and performance of start-ups.  Our results indicate that a higher level of 
debtor protection reduces small corporations’ access to capital, causing these firms to grow 
slower and to fail more often.  Our study relates to the important strand of literature that 
shows that creditor rights affect the functioning of credit markets (La Porta et al., 1997; La 
Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2003; Djankov et al., 2007; Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Qian 
and Strahan, 2007; Davydenko and Franks; 2008).  Moreover, our study also contributes to 
the large body of research on the real effects of financing constraints.3  In particular, we show 
                                               
2 Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) study a model of entrpreneurship in which entrepreneurs differ only on their 
degree of risk aversion.  In equilibrium, the less ri k averse individuals become entrepreneurs.  Consistent with 
the view that entrepreneurs are sensitive to their risk exposure, Fan and White (2003), and Armour and 
Cumming (2008) document that individuals protected by debtor-friendly bankruptcy systems are substantially 
more likely to be self-employed.    
3 See Stein (2003) for a survey. 
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that the performance of nascent firms is particularly sensitive to frictions in the credit 
markets. 
 Our paper also significantly improves over existing literature that analyzes the effects 
of bankruptcy exemptions on the methodological front.  While previous studies use cross-
sectional variation in exemption laws, our paper is the first to exploit the effect of laws that 
increased the exemption level in the same state. 4  In particular, our identification strategy 
allows us to address at least two important econometric concerns.  First, the panel structure of 
our data enables us to rule out unobserved heterogeneity across entrepreneurs, firms, and 
states.  This addresses the important concern that high exemption states may attract a 
different (e.g., less skilled) pool of entrepreneurs.  The evidence in Fan and White (2003) 
corroborates this concern.  They find that individuals in high exemption states are 
substantially more likely to be self-employed (see also Armour and Cumming, 2008).  
Second, current or expected future economic conditions could have influenced the passage of 
the exemption laws in the state.  To tackle this concern, we exploit differential effects of 
exemption laws on proprietorships and corporations. 
  Finally, our results also have important policy implications.  First, we document that 
higher a level of debtor protection inhibits entrepreneurs from acquiring the capital necessary 
to operate the business.  Second, our results confirm that access to capital is an important 
determinant of start-up growth and survival (Evans d Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al., 
1994).  Third, although personal bankruptcy law does not seem to affect directly corporations, 
our results indicate that it is actually this group of start-ups that are more negatively affected.  
                                               
4 Gropp et al. (1997) investigate the effect of state bankruptcy exemptions on the consumer credit market, 
while Berkowitz and White (2004) and Berger et al. (2011) study the effect of the exemptions on the small 
business credit market.  Finally, Berkowitz, and Hynes (1999) and Lin and White (2001) study whether 
exemptions affect mortgages.   
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This is an important finding, because 70% of U.S. firms are organized either as C- or S-
corporations and make up 83% of total employment.5   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II details he institutional background of 
personal bankruptcy law in the U.S.  The dataset and the variables used in our analysis are 
described in Section III.  Section IV develops our hypotheses and presents the empirical 
strategy.  Section V presents the results and Section VI concludes. 
II.  Institutional background 
a. Personal Bankruptcy Law 
There are two different personal bankruptcy procedur s in the U.S. – Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13 – and, during our sample period, debtors we e allowed to choose between them.  
When an individual files for bankruptcy, all collection efforts by creditors terminate.  Under 
Chapter 13, the debtors’ wealth is exempted, but they must propose a repayment plan.  This 
plan typically involves using a proportion of the dbtor’s future earnings over a five-year 
period to repay debt.  Repayment plans must give creditors the same amount they would 
receive under Chapter 7, but no more. 
Under Chapter 7, all of the debtor’s future earnings are exempt from the obligation to 
repay – the “fresh start” principle.  Roughly 70% of t tal bankruptcy filings in the U.S. are 
under Chapter 7.  In a Chapter 7 filing, debtors must t rn over any unsecured assets they own 
above a predetermined exemption level (the secured debts cannot be discharged).  The “fresh 
start” is mandated by Federal law, and applies through ut the U.S.  In 1978, Congress 
adopted a uniform federal bankruptcy exemption, but gave the states the right to opt out and 
                                               
5 Statistics are derived from the 2008 Statistics of U.S. Businesses (Census Bureau).  These figures exclude 
firms that are non-profit, government owned, or with unspecified organization type.  Limited liability firms 





to adopt their own exemption levels.  By the beginning of the 1980s, two-thirds of the states 
had opted out.  The wealth exemptions vary widely across states as a result.6 
There are generally two types of exemptions: for equity in owner-occupied residences 
(the homestead exemption), and for various other types of personal assets (the personal 
property exemption).  Homestead exemptions specify a dollar amount of equity that the 
debtor is entitled to protect in the event of bankruptcy.  Personal property exemptions may 
apply to assets as diverse as the bible, other books, musical instruments, burial plots, family 
portraits, clothing, wedding rings, other jewelry, furniture, guns, pets, cattle, crops, motor 
vehicles, health aids, and food.  In many states, however, the law leaves unspecified the value 
of many of these assets.  Our measure of personal property exemptions comprises only assets 
that have specific dollar amounts in all states: jewelry, motor vehicle, cash and deposits, and 
a “wildcard” (an exemption that applies to any property). 
Table 1 displays the homestead and personal property exemptions by state for 2004 
and 2008, which we obtain from individual state legal codes.7  The homestead exemptions are 
quantitatively more important than the personal prope ty exemptions for nearly all states.  
Moreover, the homestead exemptions exhibit greater variation across states, ranging from 
zero (e.g., Maryland) to unlimited (e.g., Florida and Texas). 
b. Changes in state exemptions during 2004-2008 
                                               
6 On October 17, 2005, a reform to the U.S. personal Bankruptcy Code – The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 – became effective.  The objective was to prevent borrowers from 
abusing the bankruptcy regime by using it to clear debts they could afford to pay.  The reform made it more 
difficult for high-income people to file for Chapter 7 (borrowers are required to pass a means test), but 
specifically excluded small business owners from the test as long as their debts are mainly business dbts. 
7 Some states allow their residents to choose between the state and the federal exemptions.  In these ca s, 
we selected the option which grants the claimant with the highest exemption level.  In some states, married 
couples are allowed to double the amount of the exemption when filing for bankruptcy together (called 




During our sample period, 2004-2008, some states enact d laws that increased 
substantially their homestead exemption levels.  Four states (Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, 
and Rhode Island) experienced increases larger than $100,000 in their exemption levels, 
while six states (Delaware, Idaho, New Mexico, New York, South Carolina, and Washington) 
experienced increases between $50,000 and $100,000.  Other states experienced smaller 
increases in their exemptions levels during the sample period.8   
We are unaware of any study that investigates the political context behind which these 
exemption laws were passed.  For some states, however, we were able to collect some 
anecdotal evidence regarding the motivation of the c ange in law.  We obtained the 
information from comments, reports, and public hearings on the proposed bills.  According to 
the evidence collected, the proposals of an increase in the homestead exemption were backed 
by three arguments.   
The first and main argument is the gap between the homestead exemption value and 
current house prices.  Proponents of the increase in the exemptions levels argued that, since 
in most states the exemption levels are not updated regularly, sharp increases in house prices 
and inflation together eroded the homestead’s purpose of protecting home ownership.  In 
most cases, the discussion surrounding the approval of the bill focused indeed on the mode of 
determining a fair homestead value that reflected current house prices.  For instance, the bill 
that increased the homestead exemption in Nevada from $125,000 to $200,000 was promoted 
by the Southern Nevada Homebuilders Association and the Realtors Association.  These 
lobbyists based their case on the sharp increase in house prices in Las Vegas.9 
                                               
8 The states with increases above $10,000 (and below $50,000) are: Ohio, Illinois, North Carolina, Indiana, 
Colorado, Maine, and Nebraska.  The states with increases below $10,000 are: New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Hawaii, Michigan, Connecticut, Arkansas, Kentucky, Oregon, and District of Columbia.  Most of these small 
increases below $10,000 simply reflect nominal adjustments. 
9 See comment by Kathia Pereira on the proposed bill at: http://law.unlv.edu/sites/default/files/SB70.pdf.   
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A second argument often used is that skyrocketing medical expenses increased the 
need of such protection by medical indebted households.10  This concern is in line with the 
evidence in Domowitz and Sartain (1999), who find medical debt to be one of the most 
important determinants of the consumer bankruptcy decision.   
The third argument is that the state’s exemption level is much lower than the 
exemptions offered by the other states.  Brinig andBuckley (1996) argue that states use 
bankruptcy law to compete for “deadbeats,” i.e., agents who cross state lines to avoid 
repayment of debts.  These “deadbeats” make desirable immigrants, since they bring to the 
state assets to protect.  For instance, the fact tht Nebraska is surrounded by three states that 
have unlimited homestead exemptions (South Dakota, Iowa, and Kansas) may have 
contributed decisively to the increase in homestead xemption from $12,500 to $60,000, 
effective on January of 2007.   
Overall, it seems that the main purpose of increasing homestead exemption levels was 
to restore a reasonable level of insurance to debtors, which had been eroded by increasing 
house price values and medical costs.  It is also important to note that the in the majority of 
the bills we analyzed, the discussion was overly influe ced by a well-identified pressure 
group with clear private interests.  The main promoters of the increase in exemption levels 
were typically attorneys, law firms, and local bar associations.  Hynes et al. (2004) argue that 
lawyers have strong incentives to lobby in favor of generous debtor protection, as this 
increases bankruptcy and debt-related litigation.  On the opposite side sat representatives of 
local associations of banks and collectors.  
 
                                               
10 See, for instance, the report on bill HB1805 to raise the homestead exemption in Washington from 
$40,000 to $100,000, at: http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2007-
08/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/1805.HBR.pdf.  See also the transcripts on proposal LB237 to increase the 




III.  Data description 
This paper uses confidential data from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS).  The KFS is 
a longitudinal survey that collected information for a sample of 4,928 start-ups that began 
operations in 2004 in the United States.  In addition o the 2004 baseline year data, we use 
four years of follow-up data (2005 to 2008).  The KFS contains detailed information on the 
financial capital injections (both debt and equity) these firms receive at their inception and in 
subsequent years.  The survey also provides detailed information on the firm, such as its 
credit history, geographic location, and industry, and information on up to ten owners, such 
as experience, education, gender, race, and age.   
Table 2 provides definitions of all variables and summary statistics (means and 
standard deviations) for the 2004 baseline survey and for the subsequent panel years (2005-
2008).  We report these statistics for the 3,419 firms of the baseline survey that either 
survived over the 2005-2008 period, or were identified as going out of business over the same 
period.11 
 We group our variables into five types: firm financing structure, firm size and 
performance, other firm characteristics, owner characteristics, and state variables.  Below, we 
describe separately the variables in each group. 
a. Financing structure 
The detailed financing information in the KFS allows us to examine how debtor 
protection affects the financing structure of start-ups.  We focus on the two main sources of 
financing: debt from financial institutions, and firm owner’s funds.   
                                               
11 Each year there is some loss in sample size becaus some firm owners either cannot be located, refuse to 
respond to the follow-up survey wave, or stop operations.  The KFS dataset contains response-adjusted weights 
that were designed to minimize potential non-respone bias in the estimates (see DesRoches et al., 2010 for 
methodological details in the KFS). 
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  The first source is financing obtained from the firm owners, which includes both 
equity injections and loans made by the owner.  As noted in Robb and Robinson (2010), firm 
owners supply most of the initial funding for their businesses.  In our sample, on average 
owners’ funds represent about 60% of the total financing obtained at inception.  Interestingly, 
the share of this source of funding falls in the following years. 
The second source refers to all credit obtained for business purposes from financial 
institutions, including term loans, lines of credit, and credit cards.  The KFS further specifies 
whether these loans are obtained in the owner’s name (personal bank financing) or in the 
firm’s name (business bank financing).  From a legal st ndpoint, the distinction between 
personal bank financing and business bank financing is meaningful only for limited liability 
firms (corporations).  For unlimited liability firms (proprietorships) there is no legal 
distinction between person and business.  Therefore, we classify all bank loans obtained by 
proprietorships for business purposes as personal ba k financing. 
In our sample, total bank financing (that includes both personal and business loans) 
amounts to 29.4% of the total financing at inception.  For the average firm, this source of 
funds at birth is $52,000.  Interestingly, as firms grow older, the share of bank financing 
increases substantially to 55% of all new financing obtained, on average.  Moreover, personal 
bank loans continue to be an important source of financing as firms grow older. 
Total financing refers to all financing obtained by the firm, and it includes bank loans, 
owner financing, and two remaining sources of funding available in the KFS that we do not 
use in our analysis: other informal sources and other formal sources.  Other informal sources 
refers to financial injections made by non-financial entities that are related to either the firm 
or the owner, including loans or equity from the owner’s family (parents), friends, and 
employees of the firm.  In our sample, for the baseline survey the share of this source of 
funding is around 7%.  The second category, other formal sources, comprises financing 
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provided by non-financial entities that are independent from both the firm and its owners.  
These other formal sources include debt and equity injections by other companies, angels, 
venture capitalists, government, and other business loans.  This is the least common source of 
financing in our sample, amounting on average to only 3% of total financing at birth.  
However, this is a very important source of financing among those (few) firms who receive 
it, representing on average 42% of the total financing obtained.  
b. Firm size and performance 
We use the number of full-time employees and total revenues as two different 
measures of firm size.  These two variables are highly skewed and therefore in our 
econometric analyses we apply a logarithmic transformation to these variables.  We also 
analyze firm failure, which we measure as the event of firm bankruptcy.  About 10% of the 
firms in operation fail each year, on average.   
c. Firm characteristics 
The KFS contains the commercial credit score class of the firm from Dun & 
Bradstreet, which ranges from 1 (minimum risk) to 5 (maximum risk).  The credit scores are 
not available for about one fourth of our sample at birth, though this percentage continuously 
drops in the following years.  The reason for the missing credit scores is that Dun & 
Bradstreet sometimes did not have enough information to produce a score.  To fully exploit 
the information contained in these credit scores, we decompose the credit score variable into 
a set of mutually exclusive dummy variables, and make the ‘missing credit score dummy’ as 
the omitted category. 
We control for the legal form of the firm with a dummy that indicates whether the 
firm was set up as a proprietorship (i.e., has unlimited liability form, and therefore includes 
some partnerships), as opposed to a corporation (i.e., has limited liability form, which 
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includes some partnerships, limited liability companies, and both C- and S- corporations).  In 
our sample, 40% of the firms are set up as proprietorships.   
d. Owner characteristics 
We include several characteristics of the firm’s principal founding owner.  For the one 
third of the firms in our sample with multiple owners, we designate the principal owner by 
largest equity share.  In cases where two or more owners have similar equity shares, we 
identify the primary owner according to a number of other characteristics, such as the number 
of hours worked (see Robb and Robinson, 2010, for a detailed description of this 
methodology). 
There is ample evidence that successful entrepreneuship is largely determined by the 
perseverance, experience, and education of the entrpreneur (see, e.g., Sorensen and Chang, 
2006, for a review).  Accordingly, we include a variable that measures the number of hours 
worked weekly, a dummy that equals one if the owner sta ted businesses previously in the 
same industry, and a categorical variable for the lev l of education that ranges from one (less 
than 9th grade) to ten (doctorate).  The average entrepreneu  i  our sample works 41 hours per 
week.  Slightly less than 20% of the entrepreneurs have previous start-up experience in the 
same industry, and 57% hold at least a college degree.   
Finally, we include a dummy indicating whether the owner is from a minority group 
(black, Asian, or Hispanic), and a dummy indicating whether the owner is female. Thirty-one 
percent of the owners are female and 15% are from a minority group.12 
e. State variables 
                                               
12 Coleman and Robb (2009) and Robb et al. (2009) document large gender and race differences in the 
financing patterns of start-ups. 
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Our main variable of interest is the state exemption value.  We obtain the exemption 
values from individual state legal codes.13  Table 1 displays the state bankruptcy exemptions 
in 2004 and 2008.  The exemption value is the sum of the homestead exemption and the 
personal property exemption.   
  To address the concern that the states can vary systematically along other 
dimensions, we control for additional state-level characteristics.  First, we collect average 
state house prices from the Federal Housing Finance Ag ncy to control for changing 
conditions in real estate markets.  The inclusion of the average house prices allows us to 
interpret the homestead exemptions in terms of real amounts of debtor protection offered.    
Second, we control for differences in economic conditions with the rate of unemployment 
and with the state median household income, which we obtain from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and from the U.S. Census Bureau, respectively.  Third, from the Business Dynamics 
Statistics (Census Bureau) we obtain firm entry rates, measured as the percent change in the 
number of establishments due to births.  Higher enty rates could be correlated with fiercer 
competition, which could negatively affect the performance of start-ups (Kerr and Nanda, 
2009).    
IV.  Hypotheses development and empirical strategy   
a. Debtor protection and start-up financing 
We analyze two components of start-ups’ financing structure that can be affected by a 
change in exemptions: the owner’s own capital injections in the firm, and the amount of 
personal bank credit (i.e., credit taken in the owner’s name, not the firm) to finance the 
business operations.  First, an increase in exemptions represents an exogenous increase in 
wealth insurance that may induce risk-averse firm owners to inject more of their personal 
                                               
13 For details on the different types of exemptions, see subsection II.a. 
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wealth in the firm.  The economic mechanism we have in mind is far from novel.  It is a key 
result emerging from theories of entrepreneurship based on entrepreneurs’ risk aversion 
(Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979), and it is thought to be the main driver of the empirical 
regularity that self-employment is more prevalent when the legal environment is debtor-
friendly (Armour and Cumming, 2008; Fan and White, 2003).   
Moreover, the above effect should be stronger for unlimited liability firms 
(proprietorships) than for limited liability companies (corporations).  The legal form 
determines the exposure of the entrepreneur’s wealth to business risk.  While the limited 
liability form fully insures the entrepreneur’s wealth against any business losses, a 
proprietorship owner is personally liable for the company’s debts (i.e., the owner’s personal 
wealth is at stake). As a result, an increase in exemptions reduces the exposure of the 
proprietorship owner to business risk, while the corporation owner does not experience this 
direct effect (as the owner’s personal wealth was already protected from business failure by 
the limited liability form).   
Second, exemptions may affect how much personal credit firm owners obtain from 
financial institutions.  This channel is especially relevant because it seems to affect all start-
ups irrespective of the legal form.  On the one hand, the unlimited liability of proprietorships 
implies that all credit obtained by these firms is personal.  On the other hand, corporations 
could also be affected to the extent that their owners use personal credits to finance the firm’s 
operations.  In our representative sample, this turns out to be an important channel, as 39% of 
corporation owners report that they take personal credit to finance business operations.   
The net effect of exemptions on personal credit depends on the interaction between 
supply and demand (Gropp et al., 1997).  On the supply side, banks could reduce credit 
availability in response to the moral hazard problems induced by the exemptions (Fay et al., 
2002), and the fact that exemptions reduces the asset value creditors can seize in bankruptcy.  
17 
 
On the demand side, the wealth insurance provided by exemptions may induce risk-averse 
borrowers to increase their demand for personal credit.  We note here that, because we focus 
on loans that are taken at the personal level, we do not expect substantial differences between 
proprietorships and corporations. In both cases, the borrower is the person, not the firm, and 
therefore the legal form of the firm should not matter. 14 However, there may be differences 
in the magnitudes of the demand and supply effects, since the wealth insurance provided by 
the exemptions is stronger for a proprietorship owner than for a corporation owner.  As 
mentioned above, while exemptions insure the proprietorship owner against both personal 
and business risks, exemptions only insure corporation owners against personal risks.  As a 
result of this stronger wealth insurance, proprietoship owners may for instance increase their 
demand for credit more than corporation owners in response to an increase in exemptions.  
We will address this important empirical question in detail in the results section.  
b. Identification strategy 
To test how exemptions affect start-up financing, we exploit the time-series variation 
of exemptions during our sample period, 2004-2008.15   Specifically, the basic panel 
regression model we estimate is: 
                                               
14 We note that the effect of the exemptions on business loans should not be similar.  Personal bankruptcy 
law applies directly to proprietorships, as there is no legal distinction between the firm and the owner.  
Therefore, an increase in exemptions will imply less credit protection for an unsecured lender to a 
proprietorship.  However, this should not be the case for a small corporation.  In this case, the personal wealth of 
the owner was already protected from business failure by the limited liability form.  Therefore, increases in 
exemptions should not have an impact on the use of business loans by limited liability firms.  The empirical 
evidence is, however, inconsistent with this view.  Berkowitz and White (2004), and Berger et al. (2011), 
document that banks reduce credit availability in high exemption states for both types of firms.  These papers 
argue that the corporations could be indirectly affected by personal bankruptcy law for two reasons.  First, high 
exemptions decrease the value of personal guarantees of firm owners.  Second, banks may anticipate that 
owners of small corporations have greater incentives to transfer assets from the firm to themselves in high 
exemption states.  The latter point may be of particular relevance in the context of nascent firms, where weak 
governance mechanisms are still likely to predominate.  Because the empirical prediction regarding business 
loans is mixed, we do not include them in our test. 
15  As explained in the previous section, four states experienced increases larger than $100,000 in their 
exemption levels, six states experienced increases r nging from $50,000 to $100,000, and seven states had 
changes between $10,000 and $50,000.   
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       	  
   , (1) 
where j indexes firms, s indexes state of location, t indexes time, y is the dependent variable 
of interest,  and  are firm and year fixed effects, E is the exemption level, X are control 
variables, and u is an error term.  The year dummies control for aggre ate fluctuations.  The 
firm fixed effects ensure that we are comparing the same firm before and after the increase in 
exemptions.  
The inclusion of firm fixed effects ameliorates the important concern that the pool of 
entrepreneurs in high exemption states could be of lower quality than in low exemption states.  
Fan and White (2003), and Armour and Cumming (2008) document that generous personal 
bankruptcy systems increase substantially the probability that an individual becomes self-
employed.  This may result in high exemption states attracting less skilled (marginal) 
entrepreneurs who ex ante benefit more from the insurance provided by the exemptions.  Our 
methodology fully controls for fixed differences betw en firms, allowing us to rule out biases 
driven by unobserved heterogeneity at the state and firm level.   
An important feature of the regression model in equation (1) is that it accounts for the 
fact that we have several exemption laws staggered during our sample period. Consequently, 
our control group is not restricted to states that never raised exemptions.  Equation (1) 
implicitly takes as the control group all firms located in states not changing exemptions at 
time t, even if they changed exemptions before or will change exemptions later on. 
One concern that the above methodology does not address is that current or expected 
future economic conditions could have influenced the passage of the exemption laws.  Hence 
our findings with equation (1) might be spurious if, for example, worse economic conditions 
are driving both the increase in exemptions and the changes in the financing structure of start-
ups in that state.  Although the anecdotal evidence we presented earlier does not hint at such a 
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link, this seems a reasonable concern because economic c nditions can reduce bank lending 
or the owner willingness to inject capital in the firm.  
To tackle this concern we exploit differential effects of the exemptions on the 
financing structure of proprietorships and corporati ns.  As explained before, the legal form 
determines the exposure of the entrepreneur’s wealth to business risk.  In particular, an 
increase in exemptions reduces the exposure to business risk for proprietorship owners, while 
not affecting significantly the corporation owner.   
Our identification strategy hinges on this asymmetric increase in wealth insurance to 
business risk that should be experienced mostly by proprietorship owners.16  Accordingly, we 
augment our previous regression model by allowing a increase in exemptions to impact 
differently on the financing structure of proprietorships and corporations: 
       	  	    
   , (2) 
where UL is a time-invariant dummy that equals one if the firm was set up as an unlimited 
liability company (proprietorship).  The parameter β now measures the effect of the 
exemptions for a corporation, while   measures the differential effect between a 
proprietorship and a corporation.  As discussed above, an increase in exemptions could 
induce proprietorship owners to inject more of their personal wealth in the firm, while the 
same effect should be weaker for corporations.  With respect to funds borrowed at the 
personal level, the prediction is less clear, because it depends on supply and demand 
considerations.  On the supply side, we expect a strong negative impact affecting all firm 
owners, since banks may anticipate moral hazard and opportunistic behavior from the 
borrowers.  This would also be consistent with cross-sectional evidence from other papers.  
On the demand side, we expect a positive effect resulting from the wealth insurance provided 
                                               
16 An increase in exemptions also provides wealth insurance to all entrepreneurs against personal risks, such 
as illness.  However, the value of such insurance should not depend on the legal form of the firm, andhence we 
expect our empirical analysis to “difference out” such effects.  
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by exemptions.  This potential increase in demand should be stronger for proprietorships than 
for corporations, since only proprietorship owners benefit from an increase in wealth 
insurance against business risks. 
c. Debtor protection, firm growth, and firm survival 
An important stream of research shows that the availability of financing affects the 
growth rate and the probability of survival of start-ups. 17  For instance, if bankruptcy 
exemptions reduce firm financing, we would expect start-ups in high exemption states to start 
smaller, to grow slower, and to be more likely to fail.  Furthermore, if our conjecture that 
corporations could face a steeper reduction in financing than proprietorships holds, then 
corporations should also experience slower growth rates and higher failure rates.  
We begin by studying the effect of the increase in xemptions on start-ups’ growth 
rates.  To this end, we estimate equations (1) and (2), using as dependent variables the growth 
rate of the number of employees and the growth rate of r venues.   
Next, we use duration analysis to investigate the effect of exemptions on firm failure.  
We estimate the following basic semi-parametric disrete hazard model:  
 log     	  
 . (3) 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hazard r te, i.e., the probability of firm 
bankruptcy at time t given that it survived until t-1.  The term  is the log of the baseline 
hazard and it captures aggregate variations in failure rates.  Each regression coefficient 
measures the semi-elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to the explanatory variable. 
One concern that the above duration model raises is that it mixes cross-section 
variation in state exemptions with within-state increases in exemptions.  To be consistent 
                                               
17 For example, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) show that firms owned by entrepreneurs who received inheritances 
suffer a substantial increase in receipts and are mor  likely to survive.  Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) 
present a dynamic contracting model in which credit constrains cause firms to start smaller and consequently 
experience lower growth rates and lower survival rates.         
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with our previous empirical strategy, we need to disentangle the two sources of variation and 
focus on the latter.  We separate the effect on firm survival of the exemption level at the 
firm’s inception from the effect of subsequent increases in the exemptions with the following 
reparametrization of model (3):    
      	  ∆∆	  
  
∆∆. (4) 
In this specification, Es0 is the exemption level in state s in 2004, while ∆Est is the 
change in the exemption level between 2004 and current time t.  Similarly, we breakdown all 
control variables into their values as of 2004 (Xjs0) and changes from 2004 to the current 
period (∆ ).
18   As before, we test for the presence of a differential effect for 
proprietorships and corporations with an interaction term of state exemptions and the legal 
form at birth.  To this end, we augment model (4) accordingly: 
 log     ∆∆	  ∆∆	    
∆∆  , (5) 
where   	  	    
.   
 To finalize, we note that the existence of a consistent differential effect for 
proprietorships and corporations across the two empirical analyses (financing and real effects) 
also provides an important test to our identification strategy. 
V. Results 
a. Debtor protection and start-up financing   
In this section, we use the passage of state laws that increased bankruptcy exemptions 
during our sample period, 2004-2008, to study the effect of exemptions on start-up financing.  
We exploit these changes in a panel data model that includes both firm and year fixed effects. 
                                               
18 Farinha and Santos (2006), and Geroski et al. (2010), employ similar methodologies to distinguish 
between the effects of founding conditions and current conditions on start-up survival.  
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We focus our analysis on two sources of funding: capital injections by the firm owner and 
personal bank debt incurred by the firm owner for business purposes. In addition, we also 
analyze total financing.  The corresponding dependent variables are the log of the level of 
personal bank financing, the log of the level of owner’s funds, and the log of total financing 
obtained by the company in that year.  We report two specifications in Table 3.  In the first 
specification (columns 1, 3 and 5), the explanatory variable of interest is the level of state 
exemptions (measured in logs).19  In the second specification (column 2, 4 and 6), we allow 
the effect of the exemptions on firm financing to depend on the legal form adopted at birth.  
To simplify notation, in the tables we label unlimited liability firms (or proprietorships) with 
“UL” and limited liability firms (or corporations) with “LL”.  We choose to report separate 
effects of exemptions for proprietorships and corporati ns, as well as the estimated 
differential effect.   
Column 1 shows that for the entire sample there is a negative and insignificant effect 
of the exemptions on firm owners’ capital injections.  In column 2 we uncover a positive and 
significant differential effect between the two types of firms that is consistent with our 
arguments on the wealth insurance effect of Section 4.  Specifically, we find that in the case 
of proprietorships, doubling the exemption level raises the inflow of personal funds from the 
proprietorship owners to the firm by 20%, though the effect is not statistically significant.  On 
the other hand, for corporations, doubling the exemption level reduces capital injections by 
corporation owners by 57%.  We find the strong negative effect somewhat surprising, as we 
were expecting a positive but weaker effect than proprietorships or no effect at all.  We will 
come back to this result and provide a tentative explanation at the end of this section.   
We next turn to the results for personal bank financing that we report in columns 3 
and 4.  Column 3 shows that an increase in exemptions reduces personal bank financing for 
                                               
19 We obtain similar results when we use the dollar amount of the exemption level. 
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all firms, suggesting that, on average, supply effects dominate demand effects.  Specifically, 
our estimates show that doubling the exemption level l ads to a 38% decrease in the flow of 
personal bank financing.  This finding corroborates previous findings based on cross-section 
data for consumer lending (Gropp et al., 1997).   
Column 4 shows that the decrease in personal bank financing is entirely driven by the 
corporations.  That is, while corporations suffer a sh rp reduction in personal bank financing 
(i.e., supply effect dominates demand effects), our estimates indicate that proprietorships are 
able to maintain the same level of personal bank fiancing.  The differential effect between 
the two groups is both economically and statistically significant. One potential explanation 
for this result is that, since the exogenous increase in wealth insurance is stronger for 
proprietorship owners, an increase in exemptions could have a stronger effect on their risk-
taking (compared with small corporations).  In particular, in the same way that exemptions 
seem to induce proprietorship owners to inject more of their personal wealth in the firm, they 
could also induce some proprietorship owners to seek more credit to finance the firm.   
It is also true that taken at face value, our results could also be interpreted as lack of 
evidence that exemptions affect personal bank financi g in the case of proprietorship owners.  
To shed some more light on this issue, we use loan-level data of the KFS, which is available 
only for the years 2007 and 2008.  In these survey years, respondents were asked whether 
they applied for a loan, and if yes, whether the application was accepted or rejected by the 
lender.  We use these questions to build a proxy for supply (Denied) and a proxy for demand 
(Applied) of credit.  Denied is a binary variable that equals one if the firm applied for credit 
but was rejected, and zero otherwise, while Applied is a binary variable that equals one if the 
firm applied for credit, and zero otherwise.  We estimate probit regressions of Denied and 
Applied on all state, firm, and owner characteristics we pr sented in Table 2.  We find a 
statistically significant negative effect of the exemptions on denial rates for both types of 
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firms.  Moreover, the data clearly rejects a differential effect for proprietorships and 
corporations.  In contrast, we find a significant differential effect in application rates that is 
consistent with our conjecture that proprietorship owners increase more their demand for 
credit than corporation owners.  Specifically, higher exemptions increase the probability of 
credit applications more in the case of proprietorship  than for corporations and the 
differential effect is significant at the 10% level. 20  These findings seem to corroborate our 
interpretation of the financing results we obtained in Table 3.  In particular, exemptions 
indeed seem to have a negative effect on the supply of credit for all firms.  However on the 
demand side, exemptions seem to have a stronger positive effect on proprietorship owners. 
This extra piece of evidence can explain why for this group we do not observe any effect of 
the exemptions on the equilibrium levels of personal bank financing in Table 3, as the 
demand effect offsets the supply effect for this group. 
Overall, the above results provide strong evidence of a new channel through which 
small corporations suffer when personal bankruptcy exemptions increase.  Because a large 
percentage of corporation owners borrow at the personal level to fund their business 
operations, and because increases in exemptions strongly reduce credit supply, these firms 
end up with less access to credit.  
The reduction in credit access may also help to explain our previous surprising result 
that exemptions reduce capital injections by corporation owners.  If entrepreneurs are risk-
averse and desire to ensure a smooth consumption path, then the permanent reduction in 
credit access triggered by exemptions increases the opportunity cost of investing personal 
wealth in the firm.  This is because the owner’s personal wealth could be alternatively used to 
face future liquidity shocks (see also Gropp et al., 1997).  This effect should dominate in the 
                                               
20 To save on space we choose not to report the tables for these results but are available upon request. 
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case of corporation owners, who do not experience a significant wealth insurance effect, and 
whose access to credit suffers considerably. 
As a corollary to the above results, columns 5 and 6 of table 3 investigate how 
exemptions affect total firm financing.  Besides owner equity and personal bank loans, it 
contains funds from other “inside” sources (relatives or friends of the firm, employees) and 
from other “outside” sources (business loans, ventur  capitalists, angels, other firms, and 
government).  Not surprisingly in light of the previous results, we obtained for the whole 
sample, total financing decreases when exemptions increase.  Also as expected, while the 
decrease in total financing is very pronounced for corporations, it is not significantly different 
from zero for proprietorships.  The differential effect is positive and significant at the 10% 
level. 
This differential effect corroborates one of our key arguments developed in Section 4.  
We proposed there that the wealth insurance provided by the exemptions should lead 
proprietorship owners to invest more personal funds (personal wealth and funds borrowed as 
personal loans).  In contrast, this effect should be weaker for corporation owners, since the 
limited liability form already insures the entrepreneur’s wealth against any business losses. 
Concerning the control variables, having a business credit score seems to be a crucial 
determinant of a firm’s ability to obtain financing.  Our estimates suggest that a firm with a 
missing credit score (the omitted category) obtains bout the same amount of financing as a 
firm in the highest risk category.  We note that the credit scores matter particularly for 
business loans – a category of financing we do not a alyze separately and that is included in 
total financing. 
Overall, our results provide strong evidence that st e laws that increase exemption 
levels result in a reduction in bank financing available to very young firms.  While both 
proprietorships and corporations seem to experience this decrease in bank lending, our results 
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show that proprietorship owners compensate for this reduction by investing more personal 
funds in the company.  Next, we investigate whether  exemptions affect firm growth and 
survival in a fashion consistent with these financing results. 
b. Debtor protection, firm growth, and firm survival 
We identify the effect of financing constraints on the growth rate and survival using 
the state laws that increased the exemptions.  According to our previous findings, while all 
firms suffered a decline in bank financing due to higher exemption levels, proprietorship 
owners offset this effect by investing more personal funds in the company.  If these changes 
in financing structure are indeed been induced by the exemptions, then corporations should 
also experience slower growth rates and higher failure rates than proprietorships. 
We measure firm growth in terms of the number of employees and total revenues.  
Table 4 shows two specifications for each of these variables.  In the first specification 
(columns 1 and 3), we control only for the level of exemptions (in logs).  In the second 
specification (column 2 and 4), we add the exemption level interacted with a dummy that is 
equal to one if the firm established as a proprietoship in 2004, and 0 otherwise. 
In columns 1 and 2 of table 4 we report the results for the growth rate of the number 
of employees, while columns 3 and 4 presents the results for revenues growth.  We obtain 
similar qualitative findings for employment and revenues.  For the whole sample we find no 
significant effect of the exemptions on employment (column 1) or on revenues (column 3).  
However, columns 2 and 4 uncover an interesting asymmetry between proprietorships and 
corporations.  Specifically, proprietorships grow faster when exemptions increase while 
corporations experience slower growth rates in terms of both employment and revenues.  The 
differential effects between the two types of firms are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
According to our estimates, the reduction in growth rates for the corporations is substantial.  
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Specifically, doubling the exemption level decreases their growth rate of employment by 
10% and reduces their growth rate of revenues by 28%.  For the proprietorships, the results 
are also economically very meaningful.   
So far the results confirm that the exemptions have  strong negative effect on the 
financing available to corporations, hampering their ability to grow.  Our results also seem to 
corroborate our previous finding that proprietorship  do not to suffer a decrease in overall 
financing.  Proprietorships seem to be actually stimulated to expand.  We note that this 
finding could also be a rational response of more risk-taking when the owner is faced with an 
unexpected increase in wealth insurance.  These higher rowth rates could simply reflect 
proprietorship owners’ desire to increase their exposure to firm risk by expanding the firm’s 
activities (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979). 
In table 5 we report the regressions on the effect of debtor protection on the survival 
of start-ups.21  We estimate semi-parametric hazard models using data from all survey waves 
(2004-2008).  The dependent variable is the hazard rate, which measures the probability that 
the firm exits at year t, given that it survived until t-1. 
In order to make our survival analysis consistent with the empirical strategy used 
previously, we disentangle the two sources of variation in exemptions.  In particular, we 
separate the effect on firm survival of the exemption level at the firm’s inception (2004) from 
the effect of subsequent increases in the exemptions (2005-2008).  We note that while the 
former uses only cross-section differences in exemption levels, we are especially interested in 
the latter that exploits within-state variation.  For this reason and for brevity, we choose to 
report only the estimates for the variables expressed as yearly changes.  
                                               
21 We define a failing firm as one that reports to be no longer in business.  Some firms drop out of the 
sample because firm owners either cannot be located or refuse to respond to the survey.  These firms are not 




In columns 1 and 2, we control for other state level variables (values in 2004 and 
changes), and firm characteristics (values in 2004 and changes).  As before, we report only 
the estimates for the control variables expressed a ye rly changes.  In Column 3 and 4 we 
also add the owner characteristics (values in 2004) to control for the level of human capital.   
A change in exemptions within a state does not significa tly affect firm survival in the 
pooled sample (columns 1 and 3).  However, we remarkably uncover a differential effect for 
proprietorships and corporations that is consistent with our previous results.  Specifically, 
states that increased exemptions accelerated the failure rate of the pool of firms that 
established as corporations when founded and that were still active when the increase in 
exemptions occurred.  Moreover, the economic magnitude of this effect is important: 
doubling the exemption level increases the annual failure rate of corporations by 27% 
(column 2).  This figure means that starting from a baseline failure rate of 10%, doubling the 
exemption level increases the failure rate to 12.7%.  In contrast, our estimates show that 
doubling the exemption level decreases the failure rat of proprietorships by 26%.  The 
decrease in failure rate for the proprietorships suggests that these firms were operating below 
optimal scale (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1994).  The increase in exemptions accelerated the 
growth rate of proprietorships, which perhaps made them reach quicker their minimum 
efficient scale, and hence experience lower failure rat s.  
Our survival analysis uncovers other interesting fidings among our dynamic control 
variables.  First, states with sharper declines in real estate markets experienced a larger 
increase in start-up failure rates.  Second, states hat experienced increasing rates of new firm 
entry also experienced an increase in failure rates.  This suggests that our entry rate variable 
could be capturing an increase in market competition or churning entry (Kerr and Nanda, 
2009).  Third, credit ratings are good predictors of firm failure.  Firms that experience 
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improvements in their credit scores experience lower failure rates, while a credit score 
downgrade or a missing score are good predictors of firm failure.  
The estimates we obtain for the owner characteristics (columns 3 and 4) are sensible 
and in line with previous evidence.  Our estimates confirm that human capital is an important 
determinant of firm survival (Cressy, 1996).  Specifically, we find that start-ups founded by 
more educated owners, owners that have previous experi nce in the firm’s industry, and 
owners who put more effort in terms of working hours a e more likely to survive.   
Overall, our findings provide strong evidence that exemptions reduce growth rates and 
survival for small corporations, while they seem to benefit proprietorships.  We think that one 
important explanation of these results lies in the findings of Section 5a.  While corporations 
experience a reduction in bank credit availability that prevents them from expanding their 
businesses, the wealth insurance provided by the exemptions to proprietorship owners leads 
these individuals to compensate for the lack of bank financing by injecting personal funds in 
the firm and to be less conservative in their expansion policies.   
VI.  Conclusion 
 We exploit times series changes in U.S. state exemption levels to analyze the effect 
of debtor protection on start-ups’ financing sources and on their performance.  The panel 
structure of our data allows us to rule out biases driven by unobserved heterogeneity at the 
state and firm level.  Our empirical strategy also exploits the fact that an increase in the 
exemption level provides a higher level of wealth insurance to proprietorship owners than to 
owners of small corporations.    
We find that an increase in the borrower’s personal wealth that is protected from 
creditors in bankruptcy reduces the inflow of bank financing to proprietorships and small 
corporations.  However, proprietorship owners compensate for the decrease in bank financing 
by investing more personal funds in the company.  We argue that this is a rational response 
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by risk-averse individuals to the increase in wealth insurance provided by the higher 
exemption level.   
To corroborate our view that these changes in financing structure reflect credit 
constraints induced by the exemptions, we investigate whether the exemptions affect the 
growth rate and probability of survival of these start-ups.  Consistent with a reduction in 
available funding for small corporations, we find that an increase in the exemption level 
reduces their growth rate (measured both, in terms of employees and revenues) and 
accelerates their failure rate.  In contrast, higher exemptions increase the growth rate of 
proprietorships and improve their survival chances.   
Our results indicate that higher levels of debtor protection prevent small corporations 
from acquiring the capital necessary to operate the business, undermining their ability to 
grow and survive.  We argue that this effect is economically relevant and has important 
policy implications, since the majority of U.S. firms adopt the limited liability form. 
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Table 1 – Bankruptcy exemptions by state in 2004 and 2008 
The table displays the dollar amounts of homestead and personal property exemptions for each state in 2004 and 2008.  We obtain 
the exemptions from individual state legal codes.  F indicates that the Federal exemption was selected and D indicates that the 
exemption was doubled.  In some states married couples are allowed to double the amount of the exemptions when filing for 
bankruptcy together (called “doubling”).  We have doubled all amounts except in those cases where bankruptcy law explicitly 
prohibits “doubling.” 
State Exemptions in 2004 ($)  Exemptions in 2008 ($) 
Homestead Personal  Homestead Personal 
Alabama D 10,000 6,000  10,000 6,000 
Alaska 67,500 13,500  70,200 14,040 
Arizona 150,000 10,300  150,000 10,300 
Arkansas unlimited 2,900  Unlimited 2,900 
California D 75,000 16,450  75,000 16,450 
Colorado D 90,000 8,000  120,000 14,000 
Connecticut D 150,000 5,000  150,000 9,000 
D.C. F, D unlimited 10,300  Unlimited 11,300 
Delaware 0 5,000  50,000 40,000 
Florida unlimited 4,000  Unlimited 4,000 
Georgia D 20,000 9,200  20,000 9,200 
Hawaii F, D 36,900 12,000  40,400 11,300 
Idaho 50,000 9,600  100,000 13,600 
Illinois D 15,000 6,400  30,000 12,800 
Indiana D 10,000 0  30,000 16,600 
Iowa unlimited 10,200  Unlimited 20,000 
Kansas unlimited 42,000  Unlimited 42,000 
Kentucky D 36,900 12,000  40,400 11,300 
Louisiana 25,000 15,000  25,000 15,000 
Maine D 70,000 12,300  95,000 12,300 
Maryland 0 22,000  0 22,000 
Massachusetts 500,000 2,650  500,000 2,650 
Michigan F, D 36,900 12,000  40,400 11,300 
Minnesota 200,000 4,000  300,000 8,400 
Mississippi D 150,000 20,000  150,000 20,000 
Missouri 15,000 9,500  15,000 9,500 
Montana D 200,000 14,000  500,000 14,000 
Nebraska 12,500 4,800  60,000 4,800 
Nevada 200,000 40,000  550,000 42,000 
New Hampshire D 200,000 16,000  200,000 16,000 
New Jersey F, D 36,900 12,000  40,400 11,300 
New Mexico D 60,000 14,000  120,000 14,000 
New York D 20,000 4,800  100,000 4,800 
North Carolina D 20,000 4,000  37,000 8,000 
North Dakota 80,000 7,400  80,000 7,400 
Ohio D 10,000 4,400  40,400 12,100 
Oklahoma unlimited 6,000  unlimited 15,000 
Oregon D 33,000 22,800  39,600 23,700 
Pennsylvania F, D 36,900 12,000  40,400 11,300 
Rhode Island 200,000 22,000  300,000 38,000 
South Carolina F, D 36,900 12,000  100,000 12,000 
South Dakota unlimited 10,000  unlimited 10,000 
Tennessee D 7,500 8,000  7,500 8,000 
Texas unlimited 60,000  unlimited 60,000 
Utah D 40,000 5,000  40,000 5,000 
Vermont D 150,000 14,800  150,000 14,800 
Virginia D 10,000 10,000  10,000 10,000 
Washington 40,000 11,000  125,000 11,000 
West Virginia D 50,000 8,400  50,000 8,400 
Wisconsin 40,000 14,400  40,000 14,400 
Wyoming D 20,000 4,800  20,000 4,800 
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Table 2 – Variable definitions and summary statistics 
The dataset is the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS).  Thetable defines all variables and displays means and standard deviations (S.d.) for the baseline survey (2004) and for the panel years 2005-2008.  The 
omitted credit risk category is missing.  The sample contains 3,419 firms that either survived over th 2005-2008 period or were verified as going out of business over the same period.  All statistics take
into account the KFS sample weights. 
Variable Description 
Baseline (2004)  Panel (2005-2008) 
Mean S.d.  Mean S.d. 
Financing sources       
Owner equity Total financing from the firm owner ($000) 52.69 1240.76  13.56 120.44 
Bank financing Total financing from financial institutions ($000) 52.18 365.05  58.64 779.10 
Personal bank loans Total bank financing in the owner’s name ($000) 26.98 171.28  23.12 424.59 
Total financing Total firm financing ($000) 139.52 1389.43  153.75 3353.34 
Firm size/performance       
Employees Number of full time employees 1.63 4.89  3.15 8.91 
Revenues Total revenues ($000) 120.62 753.40  505.91 5899.71 
Failure rate % of firms filing for bankruptcy per year     9.90  
Firm characteristics       
Credit risk 1 = 1 if credit score percentile is in the range 91-100; = 0, otherwise  0.00 0.07  0.04 0.19 
Credit risk 2 = 1 if credit score percentile is in the range 71-90; = 0, otherwise  0.05 0.22  0.16 0.37 
Credit risk 3 = 1 if credit score percentile is in the range 31-70; = 0, otherwise  0.37 0.48  0.48 0.50 
Credit risk 4 = 1 if credit score percentile is in the range 11-30; = 0, otherwise  0.30 0.46  0.14 0.35 
Credit risk 5 = 1 if credit score percentile is in the range 1-10; = 0, otherwise  0.05 0.21  0.08 0.26 
Proprietorship = 1 if firm is unlimited liability (UL); = 0, if limited liability (LL) 0.40 0.49    
Owner characteristics       
Hours worked Number of hours worked weekly by the owner 41.55 24.16    
Previous experience = 1 if owner started other businesses in the same industry; = 0, otherwise 0.16 0.37    
Education Level of education attained by firm owner: ranges from 1 to 10 6.16 2.08    
Female = 1 if owner is female; = 0, otherwise 0.32 0.47    
State control variables       
House prices Average house price ($000) 240.51 117.83  261.49 126.25 
Unemployment rate Rate of unemployment (in %) 5.51 0.84  4.99 1.03 
Median income Median household income ($000) 49.57 6.74  49.57 6.74 
Entry rate % change in the number of establishments due to births 12.01 1.77  11.99 1.87 
Minority = 1 if owner is non-white; = 0, otherwise 0.15 0.36       
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Table 3 – Bankruptcy exemptions and firm financing sources 
The dependent variables are the yearly inflow of bank financing obtained in the name of the firm owner (columns (1) and (2)), the yearly 
inflow of financing from the firm owner (columns (3) and (4)), and the yearly inflow of total financing (columns (5) and (6)).  All three 
dependent variables are measured in logs.  The omitted credit risk category is missing.  The dataset comprises the 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
and 2008 Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS).  The sample contains 3,419 firms and 15,384 firm-year observations.  The regressions take into 
account the KFS longitudinal sample weights.  Robust t-statistics are provided in parentheses.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Financing sources  
Total financing 
Variable Owner financing   Personal bank loans   
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Exemptions         
Log(Exemptions) -0.27   -0.38**  -0.41**  
 (-1.37)   (-2.15)  (-2.09)  
Log(Exemptions) × LL  -0.57**   -0.62***  -0.62** 
  (-2.09)   (-2.77)  (-2.31) 
Log(Exemptions) × UL  0.20   0.00  -0.08 
  -0.85   (-0.00)  (-0.33) 
Diff. effect (UL – LL)  0.77**   0.62**  0.54* 
        
State controls        
Log(House prices) 1.21 1.19  2.34*** 2.33***  0.50 0.49 
 (1.37) (1.35)  (2.71) (2.70) (0.55) (0.53) 
Log(Median income) -2.87** -2.85**  -0.40 -0.38 -2.02 -2.00 
 (-2.08) (-2.06)  (-0.28) (-0.27) (-1.39) (-1.38) 
Unemployment rate  0.22 0.23  0.15 0.16 0.01 0.02 
 (1.45) (1.50)  (1.00) (1.04) (0.08) (0.12) 
Entry rate 0.11 0.11  -0.02 -0.02 0.14 0.14 
 (0.91) (0.95)  (-0.19) (-0.15) (1.15) (1.18) 
        
Firm characteristics        
Credit risk 1 0.00 0.03  -0.32 -0.30 1.00*** 1.02***  
 (0.01) (0.08)  (0.96) (0.91) (2.81) (2.85) 
Credit risk 2 0.47** 0.49**  0.13 0.13 0.92*** 0.93***  
 (2.35) (2.41)  (0.62) (0.67) (4.48) (4.53) 
Credit risk 3 0.70*** 0.71***   0.32** 0.32** 0.93***  0.93***  
 (4.38) (4.40)  (2.12) (2.13) (5.69) (5.70) 
Credit risk 4 0.30* 0.30*  0.37** 0.38** 0.38** 0.39** 
 (1.66) (1.68)  (2.15) (2.17) (2.05) (2.07) 
Credit risk 5 0.25 0.26  -0.20 -0.19 0.00 0.01 
 (1.01) (1.04)  (0.79) (0.77) (0.01) (0.03) 
        
Constant 21.80 21.60  -19.50 -19.60 24.30 24.20 
 (1.16) (1.15)  (1.01) (1.02) (1.23) (1.23) 
         
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
         






Table 4 – Bankruptcy exemptions and firm growth rate 
The dependent variables are the yearly growth rate of full-time employees (columns (1) and (2)), and the growth rate of total 
revenues (columns (3) and (4)).  The omitted credit risk category is missing.  The dataset comprises th  2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
and 2008 Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS).  The sample in columns (1) and (2) contains 3,415 firms and 14,623 firm-year 
observations.  The sample in columns (3) and (4) contains 3,392 firms and 14,395 firm-year observations.  The regressions take 
into account the KFS longitudinal sample weights.  Robust t-statistics are provided in parentheses.  The symbols ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
Employees  Revenues 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Exemptions      
Log(Exemptions) 0.013  -0.023  
 (0.35)  (-0.21)  
Log(Exemptions) × LL  -0.10**  -0.28* 
  (-2.12)  (-1.88) 
Log(Exemptions) × UL  0.20***  0.40*** 
  (3.93)  (3.05) 
Diff. effect (UL – LL)  0.30***  0.68*** 
     
State controls     
Log(House prices) 0.021 0.01 0.40 0.39 
 (0.13) (0.07) (0.74) (0.71) 
Log(Median income) 0.70** 0.71** 0.51 0.54 
 (2.32) (2.35) (0.51) (0.54) 
Unemployment rate  0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.32) (0.40) (-0.19) (-0.1) 
Entry rate -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.04 
 (-0.28) (-0.22) (0.39) (0.43) 
     
Firm characteristics     
Credit risk 1 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.24 0.26 
 (2.73) (2.88) (0.93) (1.01) 
Credit risk 2 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 
 (2.76) (2.88) (2.85) (2.92) 
Credit risk 3 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 
 (3.95) (4.01) (5.59) (5.64) 
Credit risk 4 0.01 0.01 0.42*** 0.42*** 
 (0.29) (0.33) (3.50) (3.55) 
Credit risk 5 -0.17*** -0.17*** 0.23 0.24 
 (-2.95) (-2.92) (1.24) (1.29) 
     
Constant -7.25* -7.28* -8.59 -8.90 
 (-1.80) (-1.81) (-0.64) (-0.66) 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      




Table 5 – Bankruptcy exemptions and firm exit 
The table presents estimates of proportional Cox regression models.  The coefficients measure the partial impact of each variable on 
the likelihood the firm goes bankrupt, conditional on duration.  The symbol ∆ refers to the annual change in the variable.  Credit 
score upgrade (downgrade) equals one if credit score pe centile increased (decreased) between t-1 and t.  Credit score to missing 
equals one if the firm had a credit score in t-1 and did not have one in t.  Credit score awarded equals one if the firm did not have a 
credit score in t-1 and had one in t.  The model also includes (estimates not shown) the following categories of variables measured as 
of 2004 (see also Table 2): exemptions, state controls, firm characteristics, and industry dummies.  The dataset comprises the 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS).  The regressions take into account the KFS longitudinal sample weights.  
The number of observations is 11,974 in columns (1) and (2), and 11,901 in columns (3) and (4).  Robust t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicate satistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Exemptions     
∆ Log(Exemptions) 0.08  0.06  
 (0.82)  (0.67)  
∆ Log(Exemptions) × LL  0.27***  0.24*** 
  (3.04)  (3.05) 
∆ Log(Exemptions) × UL  -0.26*  -0.25* 
  (-1.75)  (-1.65) 
Diff. effect (UL – LL)  0.52***  0.50*** 
      
State controls      
∆ Log(House prices) -0.94** -0.94** -1.23*** -1.23** 
 (-2.34) (-2.36)  (-2.80) (-2.81)  
∆ Log(Median income) 0.68 0.70 0.55 0.56 
 (0.69) (0.71) (0.50) (0.50) 
∆ Unemployment rate  -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 -0.11 
 (-0.31) (-0.46) (-1.16) (-1.27) 
∆ Entry rate 0.08* 0.07* 0.08 0.07 
 (1.77) (1.67) (1.47) (1.39) 
Firm characteristics      
Credit score upgrade -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.29*** 
 (-2.81) (-2.89) (-2.83) (-2.91) 
Credit score downgrade 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26** 0.25** 
 (2.48) (2.45) (2.27) (2.23) 
Credit score to missing 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.61*** 0.62*** 
 (6.02) (6.13) (6.09) (6.17) 
Credit score awarded -0.18 -0.18 -0.22 -0.22 
 (-1.05) (-1.06) (-1.19) (-1.21) 
     
Owner characteristics      
Hours worked    -0.01*** -0.01*** 
    (-2.81) (-2.88) 
Previous experience    -0.20* -0.20** 
    (-1.90) (-1.98) 
Education    -0.06*** -0.06*** 
    (-3.44) (-3.34) 
Female    0.12 0.13 
    (1.34) (1.37) 
Minority    0.10 0.10 
    (1.17) (1.13) 
 
